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ABSTRACT
Renowned economist, professor in the University of Lausanne, wealthy Genoese mar-
quis, esteemed and feared polemicist, Vilfredo Pareto always seems to engage in new
departures. He abandons the world of industry and the beauty of Florence in order to
devote himself to the field of domestic economy. He puts aside the study of purely theo-
retical economics and builds piece by piece a « sociology» intended to be solely experi-
mental, in other words a science that is not dependent upon value judgments. Disdaining
the sociologies that call themselves «humanitarian» and « metaphysical», or «christian »
and « marxist », rejecting propaganda and ideologies, he seeks to dispel the « fog of non-
sense» that pervades the political and social struggle. Disenchanted, skeptical, piercing,
remarkably learned and insatiably curious, yet at times incredibly naive, awkward and
headstrong, Pareto pursues the chimera of a new science that, after essaying to give pro-
per weight to Man’s desperate and unceasing need to justify his conduct, might proceed
to shed light on the profound reasons motivating that conduct and discern the factors that
promote equilibrium or mutation in society, that cause the rise and fall of the ruling
classes. From the mass of his writings there emerges an imposing tableau of customs,
beliefs, problems, hopes and feverish quests for liberty. Denigrated and worshipped, now
read but not quoted, now paraphrased but not read, contested by all, honored by few who
however have not understood him, Pareto is surely one of the forerunners of present-day
sociology: functionalism, structuralism, rational choice, action theory, ethnomethodo-
logy..., these are all his spurious offspring.
The article offers a concise presentation of Pareto’s intellectual life and positions his cur-
rent research in sociology.
Acclaimed by some, disparaged by others, Pareto’s place in the history of
social analysis persistently continues to arouse controversy. Although economists
do not dispute his importance, while deploring his sociological drifts, sociologists
on the other hand are outraged by his monstrous books, his impenetrable theories
and his esoteric epistemology, despite the kindly-disposed comments of Raymond
Aron, Talcott Parsons and a few knowledgeable sociologists.
1. – THE ITALIAN YEARS
Born in Paris on 15th July1848 of a French mother and an Italian father (in
exile in France due to his liberal ideas), Vilfredo Pareto’s family came to live in
Gênes around 1854. In 1859 the Paretos moved to Casale Monferrato and there
Vilfredo was registered for the Leardi College where he studied science and the
classics. In 1867 he obtained a degree in mathematics from the Faculty of
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Sciences of the University of Turin and then, in 1870, a Civil Engineering
Diploma from the Polytechnic College with a thesis on the theory of elasticity of
solid bodies and on the integration of differential equations which define their
equilibrium. In that same year he was engaged by the Rolling Stock Department
of the Roman Railway Company in Florence. In October 1873 he was appointed
an executive of the San Giovanni Valdarno forge of the Iron Industry Company.
He became Managing Director in 1875 and resigned his post in 1890.
In 1893 Pareto was appointed Professor of political economy at the University
of Lausanne and then, in 1907, holder of the ad personam chair of political and
social sciences. He gave up university lecturing in 1911 to devote himself exclu-
sively to his own work. Designated by the Government as Senator of the Kingdom
of Italy, on 1st March 1923, he declined that appointment for personal reasons. He
died on 19th August 1923 at Céligny in the Canton of Geneva.
From the time when he settled in Florence in 1870 Pareto participated, through
writing and speaking, in the spreading of liberal doctrines, free exchange, anti-
protectionism and pacifism commended by the Adam Smith Society. His libera-
lism was extreme and his moralism uncompromising. A critic of the policy of Ita-
lian Governments of the time, of the ideas and actions of the whole ruling class,
Pareto could see in politics only ambition and bad faith, intrigues exploiting popu-
lar passions. Power is only corruption, trickery and malice. His hostility towards
the centralizing and bureaucratic State went hand in hand with the quest for a fair
social, economic and political order. His intransigence, his fight against protectio-
nism, against armament programs, against Government Minister Crispi’s gallo-
phobia and the malpractices of wheeling and dealing, left him on his own, a publi-
cist without a public and without influence.
2. – THE SWISS PERIOD
Around 1890, through the economist Maffeo Pantaleoni, he discovered the
works of Léon Walras and the marginalist school. His conversion to the « new
economic doctrines», to mathematical economy and to the theory of general equi-
librium was instantaneous. University lecturing made it possible for him to devote
himself entirely to the study of economic theories and to applying mathematics to
the social sciences.
At the age of 48 Pareto published his first book, Cours d’économie politique,
in which he explains the theories of capital, production, trade and crises. After
presenting the general principles of pure economy, a science which must be stu-
died in accordance with the same criteria as those of physics, he puts forward the
constants and uniformities of human actions. Some of these actions bring about a
pleasant sensation, called ophelimity, an idea which « expresses the relationship of
affinity whereby something meets a need or satisfies a desire, legitimate or not»;
others, which are the utilities, supply certain conditions of health, development of
the body and of the intelligence for individuals and aggregates, for whom they
also provide for reproduction. By means of these ideas, Pareto worked out abstract
models which allowed him to gather and classify facts and then draw empirical or
rational laws from them. Thus, the researcher can explain specific and complex
phenomena. A typical example of this conceptualization is given by the graph of
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incomes, or wealth graph. Pareto shows that the distribution of income takes the
form of a spinning top with its point turned upward, in all countries. The poor
form the rounded lower part of the reversed spinning top and the rich the upper
part, at the pointed end. An increase in minimum income and a reduction in the
inequality of incomes can only be produced, either in isolation or cumulatively, if
the total of the incomes increases faster than the population. An increase in the
number of large fortunes does not produce a general growth in wealth, any more
than an increase in the number of the poor brings about general impoverishment
in the country. In other words, the inequality of fortunes and the reduction of pau-
perism are two very different things. Redistribution of wealth could enlarge the
base of the spinning top and thin down its pointed end, but the loss suffered by the
rich would clearly be less than the poor would gain and so the social differences
would remain practically the same. Improving the living conditions of the poor
and the problem of greater social justice depend more on an increase in production
than on the distribution of wealth. According to this theory, « Pareto’s Law» also
states, the «natural forces», the causes which act to determine distribution,
depend more on the nature of men than on the organization of society. The shape
of the spinning top is not a matter of chance, otherwise it would be like the proba-
bilities curve. Now the distribution curve differs totally from the probabilities
curve, well known to statisticians under the name of «error curve». It is created
by a universal law.
The Cours d’économie politique, in addition to the general principles of social
evolution (history is immobile, cyclic, Man always the same throughout the cen-
turies) presents a theory of social physiology according to which societies are
never homogeneous. Differentiations, antagonisms, disputes and divergent inter-
ests are the resultant of « natural forces». The class struggle, in the shape of eco-
nomic competition and confrontations for power, « is the major fact which domi-
nates history». Impossible to eliminate it because « the laws of Nature soar well
above the prejudices and passions of Man. Eternal, unchangeable, they are the
expression of creative power; they represent what is, what must be, what could
not be otherwise. Man can arrive at knowing what they are but could not change
them.» (Cours d’économie politique, § 1068).
In the two volumes of Les Systèmes Socialistes (1902-1903), social doctrines
are analyzed from the point of view of logic and non-logic action as well as from
the angle of the procedures used to convert objective truths into subjective truths.
From this work it emerges that social problems cannot be resolved « by ranting
based on a more or less vague ideal of justice, but only through scientific research
to find the means of adjusting the means to the aim and, for each man, the effort
and the trouble to the enjoyment so that the minimum amount of trouble and effort
provides well-being for the largest possible number of men.» (Vol. II, Ch. IX,
page 169).
3. – ECONOMY IN SOCIOLOGY
Although he continues to proclaim his determination to make social sciences
exact sciences, Pareto, from the beginning of the century, dissects the imperfec-
tions of reason and reveals that what pushes men to act is feeling, passion and cer-
tain instincts.
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In Manuel d’économie politique (1906), homo oeconomicus is an abstract
being guided by egoism, economic systems are isolated from any possible
influence and studied at a given moment in their history. The confrontation of abs-
tract theory with specific phenomena (trade, protectionism, crises and economic
cycles) leads Pareto to evaluate the importance of logical actions, non-logical
actions, circulation of the élite, the role of ideologies, morals etc., as well as to
indicate the aims and limits of economic science. He uses the concepts of opheli-
mity, the curves of indifference, the hill of pleasure, the paths of expansion etc. to
explain the various types of equilibria, the properties of partial equilibria, of gene-
ral equilibrium, to give a completed formulation of the theory of social return or
of the collective economic optimum. While the standard theories of general inter-
est were based on the individual comparability of satisfaction, the maximizing of
the sum total of satisfaction and a fair distribution of income, Pareto asserts that
the ophelimities of different individuals cannot be compared and he consequently
rejects all rules of distribution.
Direct proof of this evolution is given by the irreverent book Le mythe ver-
tuïste et la littérature immorale (1911) in which moralism and puritanism, huma-
nitarian ideologies, feelings of renunciation and asceticism, are judged to be dis-
plays of weakness, ways of duping the gullible.
In the monumental Traité de sociologie général (1916), Pareto systematizes his
conception of sociology as an «exclusively experimental» general social science
which at once sets aside observable, commensurable and calculable behavior and
as a matter of priority he concerns himself with linguistic customs, innate logic,
forms of subjectivity irreducible in the calculation, regularities of cultural mea-
nings, thoughtless motivations in social life, the justifications they are given, the
sense attributed to the contents of historical actions, the internal structure of beha-
vior, the component principles of affective, apparent and procedural rationality, and
the non-logical. This sociology aims at revealing the mechanisms which produce
society’s symbolic universes. Instead of the idea of law, Pareto uses the idea of uni-
formity, i.e. of a statement true under certain conditions. Science must study the
uniformities and mutually dependent ties which exist between social facts. It pro-
ceeds by successive approximations. Economy makes a first approximation
towards the understanding of human behavior, a second approximation is provided
by applied economy, and the others by sociology. The Science is neither a recons-
truction-restoration of social reality, nor a pure reflection of it, nor is it a more or
less impressionistic copy of it. It constructs scientific objects by artificial extraction
from the actual universe; it defines the relations which connect the theoretical
constructions together and then it transposes the results found to other simplified
universes, indeed applies them by analogy to different realities so as to obtain new
constructions of objects and of conditional operators. At the basis of all analyses
there is action, i.e. behavior oriented towards objectives; the action is an effort, an
expenditure of energy implying at least a motive. Pareto works out a theory for the
action in all its complex interdependencies. From this theory he deduces the pro-
perties of the «system object». The theoretical constructions thus obtained are
«simple hypotheses» which stay alive as long as they agree with the facts, and die
and disappear when new studies destroy this agreement.» (Traité..., § 52).
Social phenomena have changing forms, manifested briefly by symbolic sys-
tems such as ideologies, customs, collective representations, traditions etc. On the
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other hand, the background is discovered by deduction or by inference. It is theo-
retical analysis which, through a study of relationships, reveals the nature and
composition of this latent order. The form and background constitute, from ano-
ther point of view, the subjective and objective aspects of the phenomena. Repre-
sentations of the phenomena and of the relationships between human actions are
often deformed. Only the objective aspect is real, constant and unchanging.
4. – LOGICAL AND NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS
Social actions, grouped into categories of logical actions, which « are, at least
for the main part, the result of reasoning», and non-logical actions, which «arise
mainly from a certain psychological state : feelings, sub-consciousness etc.»
(§ 161), The main object of research by sociologists are reasoning, deliberations,
arguments, the logic of the subjects, objectifying the subjective, declarative and
procedural knowledge which anticipates and prescribes the actions of the social
actors. Social reality, formed of a non-conscious, constant part, can be grasped
through its variable part, i.e. thanks to the conscious interpretations deposited like
sediment in symbolic systems. Alongside demonstrative logic, Pareto conceives a
non-demonstrative logic which is that of plausible and persuasive argumentation.
Logical actions logically unite the means to the end, while in non-logical
actions this connection is non-existent. In logical action the connection must exist
for the actor but also for all those « who have wider knowledge» (§ 150). Action,
to be logical, must be so either objectively (anybody having knowledge extending
outside the action) or subjectively (the person acting). The former use experimen-
tal material and objective facts established and linked together by strict reasoning;
the latter, by far the more numerous, and of great importance in social life, are
more or less colored by logic; they form a « stack of absurdities» (§ 445) and
reflect the arbitrary nature and the change in the ways in which men think and act,
the coercive weight of the milieu, the presence in each of the social agents of pre-
judices, beliefs, values and ethos which the socialization processes have incorpo-
rated into stable institutionalized symbolic systems. From then on, human action
is crystallized into meaningful structures, neither exclusively external nor essen-
tially internal.
In the logical reasoning and developments added to non-logical actions, Pareto
again finds a pre-given, stable and latent fact, going beyond any empirical expla-
nation, conceptualized through deduction from the system of symbolic structures,
called residues, and a manifest and variable face, which can be observed empiri-
cally, called derivation.
The actor organizes his action consciously and continuously in relation to one
or more systems of significations. The typology of the logical action is an opera-
tor, useful if his predictive value is good, if he helps to formalize the means / end
relationship. However, if the efficiency and the cost cannot be arranged in accor-
dance with a means / end relationship, if the figures are not commensurable, that
operator is inadequate. Since the ends are neither given nor located, they cannot
be reduced to the formal rationality of scientific language. The rationality of
science is different from the instrumental rationality of action and decision. The
dispositional variables conjectured or conjecturable constitute a topic of logical
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value from which are drawn the premises of the arguments, of the conditional rea-
soning. It is to escape the eleatic paradox that Pareto builds the ontogenetic and
phylogenetic underframe of the residues on which rest the reasoning and equivo-
cation which underlie and accompany choices and decisions. It is true that, in
doing this, he separates the representations from the actions, while recognizing
that they can have a common source, in a field outside sociological analysis, reser-
ved for psychologists and called the «psychic state» (§ 1690-2).
5. – RESIDUES AND DERIVATIONS
Language reveals to us the tendency of men to split hairs, to argue in order to
make their behavior and beliefs plausible and acceptable. It comes before all
forms of logico-experimental and structural rationality, by means of discursive
class objects, the symbolic universes.
Residues do not exist, they are pre-constructed, both the content and know-
ledge of common sense; they are sources of sociality, conditions necessary for
structuring the symbolic meanings. At the moment of granting actors a ready-
made « logic», given in advance, they perform functions of identification, repre-
sentation and nomenclature. Their composition is found to be the extension of
spontaneous, balanced and self-regulated organization and of actions of classifi-
cation, standardizing and persuasion.
We do not know whether the residues, on account of the adaptative value, have
selected behaviors to which they are predisposed, whether they are socio-cultural
representations of human resources faced with environmental constraints, or more
or less direct manifestations of the phylogenetic factors reached by inference,
categories of predispositions of behavior selected by nature. That residues consti-
tute the implicit premises of equivocation used unknowingly by the social actors
is an indubitable fact. In some instances, they express emotions, in others they are
deduced from a representation; they always vary, throughout history, in number
and intensity. In view of the fact that the concept of residue encompasses the
intention and symbolization of the intention, the « feelings, subconscious etc.»,
transformed into symbolic relationships, become intelligible and comprehensible,
and therefore accessible, objects. In other words, the residues transcend expe-
rience and logic, are located beyond scientific language, and give great autonomy
to natural language. On the other hand, derivations give a certain foundation to
value judgments relative to the purposes of the action. Produced from specific
experience thanks to the mediate inference of argument techniques, they provide
the arguments capable of explaining how we act. By legitimizing both the objec-
tives and the means, by filling in and systematizing the gaps in our knowledge,
derivations give an apparent form of truth to the values, beliefs and convictions of
social actors. They precede feelings and contribute to strengthening them.
Of course, the typologies and classifications of the residues and derivations
are also typologies of the macro-sociological social processes, worked out from
the universalism/particularism dichotomy where universalism is the code and par-
ticularism is the context. This dichotomy is generalizing for the residues of the
instinct of combinations and the persistency of the aggregates. The four other
classes (the need to show feelings through external acts, residues in relation to
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sociability, the integrity of the individual and his dependencies, the sexual resi-
due) are specifications and particularizations of the first two classes and, while
being heterogeneous they contain the elements essential for ensuring the overall
constancy in spite of variations in detail. With regard to the types, they vary during
the stages of social development. Nevertheless, the variations are still compensa-
ted so that the classes invariably remain constant. Discourses, pseudo-scientific
theories, ideologies in general (and Pareto considers everything normative as
such) are only a simple reflection of real interests. Like the residues, derivations
are arranged in classes and types. There are four classes: affirmation, authority,
agreement with feelings or with principles, verbal proof ; they are based on lan-
guage and make residues perceivable thanks to the treatises, but they are unsui-
table for converting assertions into verifiable propositions. Derivations have no
intrinsic value, they do not act directly in fixing social equilibrium; they are only
the manifestations and indications of other forces « which are those which act in
reality in determining social equilibrium». There is no determinism of the resi-
dues over the derivations since the former are dependent on the latter and the lat-
ter can affect the residues either by hindering the manifestations or by configuring
them otherwise from time to time.
What relationship do actions have with « social utility» (§ 1687).
In the first place, for the static part, Pareto examines the distribution of resi-
dues in a given society and in different strata of that same society; next, for the
dynamic part, he studies how the residues vary in the course of time, either that
they change in individuals of the same social stratum or that the change takes
place due to a mixture of the social strata with each other, without omitting to
study how each of these phenomena acts. Residues and derivations are propaga-
ted by imitation or due to other circumstances. A study of the propagation pro-
cesses shows the existence of a third factor : interests.
Conditions of intelligibility of the action, deprived of objective existence,
connected to each other by mutual dependence or by multiple causality, the resi-
dues, derivations and interests, the factors necessary for equilibrium, however
cannot ever be grasped in their entirety. Is the method, therefore, inadequate,
indeed sterile? No, because the «even imperfect idea of mutual dependence»
avoids the difficulties of an explanation based on a single causal structure. Thanks
to the imperfect method of multiple causality, it is known that residues are more
constant than derivations, that they are partly the ‘cause’ of the derivations, « but
still remembering the secondary action of the derivations, which can sometimes
be the cause of the residues, if only in a subordinate way.» (§ 1732).
Thanks to this system of relationships, varying from society to society, from
one social class to another, from one era to another, mediation is possible between
internalized objective structures and individual conducts.
6. – SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM
Society is made up of different interdependent elements (the soil, climate,
fauna, flora, the actions of other societies on it, history, race, residues, derivations,
interests) « making up a system which we shall call a social system [...]. This sys-
tem changes form and character in the course of time and when we name the
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social system, we understand this system as considered both at a particular time
and in the successive transformations which it undergoes in a particular space of
time.» (§ 2066). To analyze it, it is necessary to define a state at a given moment.
It is the state of equilibrium. Emphasis is put on relationships of interdependence.
Neither the ultimate ends nor the indeterminable objectives outside the system,
nor even the matter of the change which is introduced in the course of evolution,
are taken into consideration. Of course, there are disruptions in the equilibrium
(wars, epidemics, floods, earthquakes and other disasters) but imbalance implies
an automatic return to equilibrium. Therefore, social phenomena have a wavy
form. Pareto does not give a real general theory of the equilibrium of society but
only a theory of an empirically determined system, a theory unsuitable for explai-
ning the transition from one system to another, for giving an explanation of the
reason for imbalance.
Composed of different groups which are antagonistic due to age, sex, physical
strength, health etc., society is not homogeneous and the equilibrium is preca-
rious. « The utilities of the various individuals are heterogeneous quantities and to
speak of the sum of these quantities makes no sense; there is none; we can envi-
sage it. If it is wished to find a sum which is related to the utilities of the various
individuals, it is necessary first of all to find a means of making these utilities
depend on homogeneous quantities, which can then be added together.» (§ 2127).
Conflict of utilities, conflicts of interests, division of society, antagonistic
values involve divergencies of aims which gives rise to heterogeneity and to fin-
ding out that there is no rationality of society. With the impossibility of establi-
shing what is the appropriate means to an end, of locating the end for which the
action is taken, of homogenizing the criteria which are at the basis of the choices,
deliberations and actions with a view to obtaining a utility, in brief of discovering
the ends, Pareto does not give any precise indication of how to reconcile rationa-
lity of action with epistemic rationality in the interpretation of historico-social
actions.
7. – UNDULATORY MOVEMENT
AND HISTORICAL EVENTS
Insofar as residues are transformed slowly, societies also change. The thesis
according to which reason has an ever greater share in human activity gives rise
to several errors. Progress comes about by following an undulatory or rhythmic
movement. The oscillations or rhythms have different ranges, durations and inten-
sities. When a phenomenon reaches its highest intensity, it is the oscillation in the
opposite direction which is generally close. This makes it impossible to explain
social phenomena by using simply linear causality or a more or less rigid deter-
minism. Political, social or religious revolutions are just, right, necessary to some,
and unjust, wrong, unnecessary to others. However, to science, there is no sense in
that. «A scientific proposition is true or it is false, it cannot in addition meet any
other condition [...],» «Science only concerns itself with finding out the relation-
ships between things or phenomena, and with discovering the uniformities of
these relationships. The study of what are called causes, if by that we understand
facts in certain relationships with others, is a matter for science and comes within
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the above category of uniformities. However, what has been called prime causes,
and in general all entities which go beyond the limits of experience, are found
there even beyond the field of science.» (Les systèmes socialistes, I, page 2).
8. – ELITES AND CIRCULATION OF THE ÉLITES
Society is divided into heterogeneous groups and classes but within the groups
and classes and between groups and classes there is intense vertical and horizon-
tal circulation. The groups and classes are in conflict but there is also a struggle
within these groups and classes. The part of the group or class which tries to
ensure hegemony over its own group or its own class, or also over all groups and
all classes, is called the élite. The theory of the élite claims to be a generalization
of the class struggle theory.
Individuals who show great capability in the respective branches of social acti-
vity make up the top layer, usually taking in those who govern, while the rest form
the lower layer, to which the governed belong (§ 2047). This stratification of
society, corroborated also by the distribution of wealth theory, is based on the
nature of men, on the role of fecundity and mortality of the social groups and on a
series of other factors ; it is not the product of economic forces or of special orga-
nizational capabilities. The inequality of status between men is determined parti-
cularly by the possession of certain «capabilities» in performing any human acti-
vity. The «capabilities» are the natural disposition of the individual to excel in a
particular activity. It is doubtful that these «capabilities» exist in nature in the
state of blind determinisms. They are rather the product of social interactions and
socialization operations. Pareto sometimes speaks of the weight of social origin
and of the technique of corruption as a means of « incapable» individuals acces-
sing or staying in the élite, but he firmly believes that the normal condition is and
remains « personal capability».
Elites can survive and keep going provided they are renewed continuously, eli-
minate degenerated elements and accept new elements within them in certain pro-
portions. Circulation between the lower layer and the upper layer - mobility - must
above all be vertical, upward, but must also be downward. There is no mobility
when there is simply assimilation or co-opting. Movement is therefore synony-
mous with equilibrium and the law which governs the continuity and forming of
élites is subject to a kind of anaklasis or refraction. Although élites can disappear
for various reasons (biological destruction, psychological change in attitudes,
decadence), there are two ways of maintaining stability and social continuity: eli-
minating those who contest and therefore jeopardize the social order and the exis-
tence of the élite, and/or absorbing the elements of the governed class who may be
useful or usable. This process of endosmosis, whereby the elements of the gover-
ned class come to form part of the aristocracy of power, is « the phenomenon of
social circulation ». The capable élite is the one which is continuously renewed
and rejuvenated. It may happen that those opposed to the élite, in order to elimi-
nate their adversaries in power, make use of the discontent of the governed classes
or use foreign intervention. The class in power then has to defend itself. Guile and
force are necessary but it is also necessary to obtain the passive consensus of the
governed class.
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9. – TYPES OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS
An «open » social order is the product of equilibrium between the residue of
the instinct of combinations and the residue of the persistency of aggregates; bet-
ween innovation, discovery and invention on the one hand and conformity with
the rules, values and social ethos on the other. Regimes are characterized by the
psychology of the élites. The distribution of residues among individuals and
among social classes is at the origin of the types of social systems. Wherever a
strong instinct for combinations prevails there is a high number of speculators,
entrepreneurs, reformers, inventors and ambitious men capable of the most hazar-
dous undertakings, and wherever a strong concentration of the residue of the per-
sistence of the aggregates is encountered, there is a predominance of people of
independent means, of individuals for whom the past is a present asset and who
want nothing to change. Speculators usually prevail by trickery, guile and other
manipulations. However, they never manage to keep control of the situation for
long because they are ousted by those of independent means who, in turn, are dri-
ven out of power by the speculators, in a perpetual movement.
The increase in individual and collective security, the weakening of the spirit
of enterprise, the growth of well-being and the peaceful co-existence between
peoples, reinforces the reticence of governments to use force. New rules and
values spread and make traditional cultural models totter. Traditional authority is
shaken by this and rebellion then becomes possible. The old social equilibrium is
replaced by a new equilibrium, a new class takes the place of the old one by force.
Social and political life is cyclic. Social change is only an ongoing rotation of
minorities which only have their sights set, beyond all else, on controlling. A
change in minority is therefore a change in form and not a change in the structure
of power, indeed a change in substance. One reality alone is ever-lasting: there is
a stratification in political and social life, that of the ruling and the ruled. It is
essentially oligarchic. Politicians promise radical change but as soon as they have
won power they defend a society which has nothing to do with whatever they pro-
mised. Then, social life is hell, cruelty is unending and the social agents are vic-
tims of illusions and myths. Men have only one small light at their disposal, a
single weapon with which to fight : science.
10. – PARETO TODAY
The blocks put down by Pareto on the building site of logic and non-logic still
remain rough hewn. Contemporary sociologists have made no real breakthrough
in research on useful beliefs, practical efficacy, the logical consequences of non-
logic reasoning, the weighing of reason in the production of historical effects.
With his concerned historical typology of contexts and their indivisible effects,
with his use of this typology in the study of actions which are reasoned but not
entirely reducible to the logical calculation, Pareto has drafted a method which
makes it easy to observe and describe the differential departures between models
or typologies and modeled or typologized social actions. This method is also a
contribution to establishing fruitful relationships between sociology and history,
to consolidating sociology as a historical discipline.
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Pareto has challenged sociologists to describe the requisites of actions, inter-
actions and pseudo-logical representations, to elucidate the unwanted relation-
ships of actions and conducts and perverse effects, to establish the differences bet-
ween utility for a collective unit, utility of a collective unit and ophelimity. That
challenge has not yet been taken up. The distinction between the truth of an utte-
rance and its social utility, the methodical description of the heterogeneity of ends,
costs of social events and the analysis of subjective utilities in social actions, are
fields of research which still lie fallow. Nowadays, the theories of action and the
cognitive theories of knowledge struggle against the same problems as Pareto
posed so well, but they have not been at all satisfactorily resolved. Neither the
positivist, culturalist or naturalist theories which seek causes of action elsewhere
than in reason, nor functionalism, rational choices, the theory of exchange which
place them in reason, none of these theories has been able to take advantage of the
paretian breakthroughs.
In the research into arguments and scientific rhetoric, into innate or natural
logic, where «arguing is more a matter of showing than demonstrating », the pre-
sence of Pareto’s work is more evident. Trends in recent sociology aim at trans-
ferring the legacy from Pareto into interactionist sociology by means of research
into natural and non-demonstrative logic. Revealing the rationalist influences of
John Stuart Mill on the theoretical and non-theoretical paretian constructions
gives a new dimension to the scope of the emotivist doctrines in the Traité de
sociologie général and brings its author back into the rationalist tradition.
If it is believed that the social sciences are not saving sciences capable of brin-
ging happiness to men who have so far sought it in vain; if one is convinced that
no social science will ever manage to define the general interest and the public
good, to resolve the problems of living well and the good society; if, however, one
is convinced that the social sciences are means capable of making social relations
intelligible, that they show how man believes, acts, produces and answers ques-
tions on the organization and conditions of life in society, on existential destiny,
then reading the works of Pareto can help researchers to free themselves of illu-
sions about truth and objectivity as absolute values. Such reading can give a
glimpse of how and why individuals produce certain knowledge, how such
knowl edge becomes the basis of action, how it is used to vitalize hopes and pro-
jects. Sociology also shows the limits and sparsity of the contents of our knowl -
edge. Produced in particular contexts, this knowledge is neither eternal nor abso-
lute. Essential wisdom which science tends to make intelligible. However, the
intelligibility is always contextual and historically situated. Sociology assists, like
a constant critique of all forms of production of knowledge, in understanding how
the study of society is a powerful means of mobilizing energies in order to arouse
consent, to justify, explain and rationalize social action, to obtain consensus, but
also in order not to confuse rationality of action and decision with epistemic ratio-
nality.
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